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You and me baby ain’t nothing but mammals:
Disgust, evolution, and the transcendence of an immaterial soul
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Abstract

Materialist theories of mind are disturbing for those who endorse the idea that an
immortal soul is distinct from the material body. Many argue for a uniqueness of the
human spirit that transcends bodily qualities. The present research focuses on the
rejection of human evolution from the perspective of disgust, which has both a physical
(body) and moral (soul) component and is elicited by objects that remind us of both death
and animals. Study 1 asked whether those primed to feel disgusted would show an
implicit preference for creationism over evolution on an Implicit Associations Test but
failed to find significance. Studies 2 and 3 found that disgust motivates a preference for
the view that humans are unique from animals but failed to disambiguate the disgust
emotion from an overall negative affect. Implications for the broader role of disgust as a
body-soul emotion, especially as it relates to rejecting evolution and scientific
reductionism, are discussed.
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Forward
Most religions endorse the idea of a soul (or spirit) that is distinct from the
physical body. As research in neuroscience increases, it seems that incrementally more
aspects of a person can be explained by the functioning of a material system. Gilbert Ryle
(1949) accused Descartes of making a category mistake when he sought to uncover the
location of a human soul - what Ryle referred to as “the ghost in the machine.” Some
theologians and even certain neuroscientists resist what the mind sciences have to tell us
about love, personality, spirituality, and morality. The term “nonmaterialist
neuroscience” has even joined “intelligent design” as an alternative interpretation of
scientific data.
Flanagan (2002) cites “the problem of the soul” as the wider concern regarding
scientific reductionism:
…A shorthand way of referring to a cluster of philosophical concepts that
are central components of the dominant humanistic image. These concepts
include, for starters, a nonphysical mind, free will, and a permanent,
abiding, and immutable self or soul. It is the survival of these concepts
that ordinary people fear at risk from scientific progress, and this fear is at
the root of the deep-seated resistance to the scientific image…If the
nonphysical mind, free will, and the soul are not real things but are mere
appearances, then, well, it is the end of the world – at least the end of the
world as we know it (p. x).
The present research focuses narrowly on resistance to the view that humans evolved
from animals: humans are not the superior product of some unique process of evolution,
and there is no special place for an immaterial or immortal soul in the wholly material
body. I will use empirical psychological methods to investigate the role of the disgust
emotion in intuitions regarding human uniqueness and, by extension, human evolution.
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This project is a wholly interdisciplinary approach; the method is psychological,
but the questions are fundamentally philosophical. Prinz (2008) argues that there is a
revolution taking place in philosophy – especially in the philosophy of mind and moral
philosophy - since philosophers have been “getting their hands dirty.” A new class of
experimental philosophers are leaving the armchair and contributing to science by
designing and conducting their own experiments. Subsequently, the present project
encompasses the broader philosophical nexus and then finds its narrow focus in
psychological literature. I am in agreement with Hume (1739), who wrote, “All the
sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature: and that however wide any of
them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or another [and] are
in some measure dependent on the science of man” (p. xix).
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Mind-body dualism and the search for an immaterial soul
The dominant view of the mind for contemporary cognitive and mind scientists is
that of a dual process model. When a person makes judgments or solves problems, there
are two processing systems at work that often arrive at differing conclusions. Zajonc
(1980) argued that feeling and thought are to some extent separate systems with
biological bases, and research on automatic evaluation confirms that very brief or even
subliminal presentations of affectively valenced words can alter a person’s goals and
motivations. Bargh (1994) went so far as to argue that most of our behaviors and
judgments are made automatically (i.e., made without intention, effort, or awareness of
process).
This idea that human actions are guided by two separate processes - one that is
slow, effortful, and under conscious control, and one that is not - is a modern evaluation
of the ancient mind-body problem in philosophy. Historically, the mind-body problem is
typically associated with dualism in the philosophy of mind, which states that the mental
(mind) and the physical (body) are radically different kinds of thing. This is, for most
individuals, the “default option” by way of dualism’s intuitive appeal – there is
something that feels qualitatively different about the way we experience our bodies and
the way we experience the inner contents of our minds. In Plato’s Phaedo, he argued that
the true substances are not physical bodies, which are ephemeral, but the eternal Forms of
which bodies are imperfect copies. Here, Plato provided a variety of arguments for the
immortality of the soul, one of which argued that the intellect is immaterial because
Forms are immaterial and intellect must have an affinity with the Forms it apprehends.
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Plato’s dualism speaks of the soul as imprisoned in the body and is integral to his entire
metaphysics.
Cartesian dualism is notable for its emphasis on interaction: Descartes held that
the mind and body are distinct substances, but that they interact at the point of the Pineal
gland. Again, Descartes’ philosophy of mind is inextricable from his wider conception of
epistemology and metaphysics, but he generally held that the one thing which we cannot
doubt is that we possess the capacity for thought, which is not subject to the material
world. As Descartes’ skepticism and doubts of the material world increased, his certainty
of the existence of his soul only augmented. The crux of his argument is as follows:
(1) I cannot be sure of anything in the material world;
(2) I am sure of the mind;
(3) Therefore, the mind is part of the immaterial world.
Descartes’ proof relies on introspection, and regardless of whether his conclusions
are sound, it seems that the lay individual can sympathize with his intuitive appeal.
Nothing is more certain to us, as humans, than the fact that we possess some superior
ability to think. And by extension, there is something distinctive between the faculties of
the mind of humans and the faculties of the minds of animals. The crux of a human being
is material flesh, a mere animal body, and yet, as Descartes purported, even the greatest
skeptic cannot doubt the existence of some immaterial soul.
In his Discourse on the Method for Conducting One’s Reason Well and for
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, Descartes (1998) wrote:
…There is none at all that puts weak minds at a greater distance from the
straight path of virtue than to imagine that the soul of beasts is of the same
nature as ours, and that, as a consequence, we have nothing to fear or to
hope for after this life any more than do flies and ants. On the other, when
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one knows how different they are, one understands much better the
arguments which prove our soul a nature entirely independent of the body,
and consequently that it is not subject to die with it. Then, since we do not
see any other causes at all for its destruction, we are naturally led to judge
from this that it is immortal (p. 34)

Placing this in the wider nexus of Descartes’ philosophy of mind, we see that he places
particular emphasis on the elevated nature of human existence. His motivation to locate
some immaterial soul within an otherwise material body reveals a key distinction that
will become the focus of the present research. The nature of human existence seems
intuitively irreducible to that of animals, and I argue that this view is not limited to
Cartesians. The body is often compared to a temple that houses a non-corporeal soul – we
perceive the soul of a human as something sacred, transcendent and elevated above and
beyond the repugnant, mortal and materially limited nature of its bodily flesh.
Descartes’ project to resurrect an immaterial soul from an otherwise materialist
view of the mind follows directly from one of the sincerest of human existential
dilemmas – the need to understand ourselves as somehow elevated beyond mere animal
qualities as a means to suppress the fear of death. In his book The Denial of Death,
Becker (1973) reflects upon the conflicted dual nature of human beings:
For ages, when philosophers talked about the core of man they referred to
it as his ‘essence’…but nothing like it was ever found…This is the
paradox: he is out of nature and hopelessly in it; he is dual, up in the stars
and yet housed in a heart-pumping, breath-gasping body…His body is a
material fleshy casing that is alien to him in many ways – the strangest and
most repugnant way being that it aches and bleeds and will decay and die.
Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own splendid
uniqueness in that he sticks out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet
he goes back into the ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot
and disappear forever. It is a terrifying dilemma to be in and to have to
live with. The lower animals are, of course, spared this painful
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contradiction, as they lack a symbolic identity and the self-consciousness
that goes with it. They merely act and move reflexively as they are driven
by their instincts (p. 26).
This conflicted essence of human existence seems an undeniable reality. The human
body, after all, is inherently disgusting – we eat, belch, fart, excrete, kill and procreate in
the same ways as our animal relatives. And this link between mortality, material flesh,
and the disgust emotion is not merely anecdotal; the Disgust Sensitivity Scale (Haidt,
McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) identifies two classes of disgust elicitors as those relating to
death or those relating to animals. And since the human body is, at its core, both mortal
and animal-like, we are motivated to repress the repugnance of our own flesh. We
inherently favor the notion that there is an undeniable transcendent quality of what we
perceive to be an immortal and immaterial soul.
From dualism to disgust
The conceptual focus of this research project is the relationship between the
disgust emotion and intuitions of human exceptionalism. Philosophers have long sought
to locate an immaterial, immortal soul in an otherwise material world. Descartes argued
for a stark distinction between the soul of humans and the soul of beasts, and Becker
reflected upon the existential dilemma of being inextricably chained to a repugnant,
mortal, fleshy body. The disgust emotion, from a dualist perspective, is significant in that
it has both a physical component and a moral component. More explicitly, disgust has
roots in both the body and the soul.
In The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin (1872) defined
disgust as referring to “something revolting, primarily in relation to the sense of taste, as
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actually perceived or vividly imagined; and secondarily to anything which causes a
similar feeling, through the sense of smell, touch and even of eyesight” (p. 253). Later,
psychoanalyst Angyal (1941) held that disgust is a reaction specifically targeted toward
waste products of the human and animal body. In particular, he related the strength of a
disgust response to the degree of intimacy and contact with the disgust elicitor and
attributed a specific importance to the mouth. Tomkins (1963) expanded upon this notion,
stating that disgust defends the self against any increase in intimacy with aversive
objects.
Rozin and Fallon (1987) have assimilated these three definitions into what they
describe as core disgust: “Revulsion at the prospect of ‘oral’ incorporation of an
offensive object. The offensive objects are contaminants; that is, if they even briefly
contact an acceptable food, they tend to render that food unacceptable” (p. 23).
Chapman, Kim, Susskind and Anderson (2009) illustrated this transition from
disgust as a physical emotion to disgust as a moral emotion by showing that the facial
response expressed in response to unfair treatment uses the same muscle that responds to
bad tastes. Rozin, Haidt and Fincher (2009) call this transition between physical and
moral domains oral to moral. Although disgust likely evolved to discourage humans
from ingesting noxious or harmful substances (Rozin, Haidt & McCauley, 2000), the
emotion also plays a significant role in shaping moral perceptions of specific groups and
acts (Bloom, 2004; Hodson & Costello, 2007). Indeed, the disgust emotion is shown in
response to immoral behavior (Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999). Wheatley and
Haidt (2005) showed that participants who were hypnotized to feel a flash of disgust
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while reading vignettes of mildly immoral behaviors rated these behaviors as more
immoral than did participants who were not hypnotized. Similarly, participants who made
moral judgments while sitting at a messy desk were more inclined to regard behaviors as
more morally wrong than did those evaluating the same moral judgments at clean desks
(Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008).
The reverse effect also holds true; Schnall, Benton and Harvey (2008)
demonstrated that making physical purity salient caused participants to make less severe
moral judgments. Thus, there exists a strong link between physical purity and moral
purity. Zhong and Liljenquist (2006) coined the “Macbeth effect” – threatening one’s
moral purity induces the need to cleanse oneself; participants asked to recall an unethical
deed from their past showed an increased cognitive accessibility of cleansing related
concepts and a greater desire for cleaning products than did those who recalled an ethical
deed. This body of research not only supports the idea that intuitive processes may
profoundly direct moral judgments (Haidt, 2001) but more specifically emphasizes the
powerful role of disgust as driving intuitions regarding morality. It comes as no surprise,
then, that disgust is able to persuade people to morally condemn certain groups or
individuals. The Jews have long been a target of disgust, which is an incredibly effective
way of motivating people toward mass murder and genocide - as was the case in the
Holocaust. Telling a certain group that they are disgusting is distinct from assigning them
with any of the other negative emotions due to its unique body-soul quality. As Bloom
(2004) explains, deeming a certain person or group of persons disgusting gets right at the
heart of Cartesian dualism – disgust is a response to people’s bodies, not to their souls.
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People with souls have moral worth, but mere bodies fall outside of the moral circle.
Nazis denied to the Jews inner mental states, failed to extend empathy to them, and
turned to disgust as a tool to commit the most heinous and debasing atrocity.
Unsurprisingly, Hodson and Costello (2007) found that individual sensitivity to
interpersonal disgust predicted dehumanizing perceptions of out-group members, thus
establishing a link between disgust sensitivity and prejudice that was not accounted for
by fear of infection or contamination. Recent work linked disgust to politically
conservative attitudes, especially purity related issues, such as abortion and gay marriage
(Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe & Bloom, 2009), and participants who scored high on the disgust
sensitivity scale (Haidt et al., 1994) showed a greater unfavorable automatic association
with homosexual as opposed to heterosexual men on an implicit associations test (Inbar,
Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). As Nussbaum (2004) writes:
The interest in having a subordinate group whose quasi-animal status
distances the dominant group further from its own animality leads, here
too, to a constructing of the woman, or the gay man, as disgusting by the
imputation of further properties found disgusting. Bad smell, sliminess,
eating feces – these are projected onto the group in ways that serve a
political goal (p. 114).
Disgust as embodied cognition
Why has the emotion of disgust expanded from the physical (i.e., the body) to the
moral (i.e., the soul)? We find one explanation in the view of human reasoning known as
embodied cognition (Lakoff, 1987). This model suggests that cognition involves
metaphors in the environment more than logical propositions and reasoning. Lakoff
(1987) describes “experiential realism,” in which “the structures used to put together our
conceptual system grow out of bodily experience and make sense in terms of it…The
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core of our conceptual systems is directly grounded in experience of a physical and social
character” (p. xiv). Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that we only
understand concepts such as push and pull because we have bodies that are familiar with
these physical sensations. Metaphor is one of the basic cognitive processes; if we did not
have the bodies and bodily experiences that we do, certain types of understanding would
not be possible. Recent experimental work in embodied cognition demonstrates a link
between physical warmth and social warmth (Williams & Bargh, 2008a; Zhong &
Leonardelli, 2008) and also a nonconscious link between physical spatial cues and social
judgment (Williams & Bargh, 2008b).
Haidt, Rozin, McCauley and Imada (1997) apply the term “embodied schemata,”
which refers to imaginative structures or patterns of experience that are based on bodily
sensations, to the disgust emotion. People generally possess ambivalent feelings toward
food, since core disgust and sensation seeking oppose each other, creating approachavoidance conflicts regarding whether or not to try new or unfamiliar foods. Food
provides humans with a wide variety of embodied schemata – “some food attracts me,”
“some food makes me nauseous,” “washing removes danger.” Haidt et al. (1997) note
that we are compelled to convey these schemata as propositions, but each one is intended
to include feelings and sensations (e.g., fear interest, hunger, revulsion) and bodily
knowledge about chewing, swallowing and vomiting. It follows, then, that Zhong and
Liljenquist (2006) found that a threat to moral purity induces the need to cleanse oneself,
and that Schnall et al. (2008) found that physical cleansing leads people to judge certain
moral actions as less wrong. The physical experience of purity is highly relevant to the
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abstract notion of moral purity, and such judgments are grounded in bodily experience. I
purport that embodied cognition bridges the link between disgust in the physical domain
and disgust in the moral domain.
I am not an animal!
A New England Puritan Cotton Mather once found himself urinating alongside a
dog, and observed that the dog presently engaged in the exact same act. He famously
wrote: “Yet I will be a more noble creature; and at the very time when my natural
necessities debase me into the condition of the beast, my spirit shall (I say at that very
time!) rise and soar…(Thomas, 1983, p. 38). Cotton Mather illuminated the same concern
articulated by Descartes and Becker – he is not an animal. The limitations of his
corporeal body debase him, but his spirit shall lift above.
Becker (1972) proposed that humans engage in many activities to minimize their
connections with animals because acknowledging this relationship makes us highly aware
that, like all other animals, we are material mortal beings. Rooted within the paradoxical
essence of the human body is knowledge of an eventual death - the surest of all things we
will ever know. Solomon, Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1991) suggest that acknowledging
our close ties with animals is disturbing: “Given such awareness, humans could not
function with equanimity if they believed that they were not inherently more significant
than apes, lizards, and lima beans” (p. 96).
I previously acknowledged that both death reminders and animal reminders are
defined by Haidt et al. (1994) as elicitors of disgust. Accordingly, two of the items on the
disgust sensitivity scale that correlate most highly with an overall score fall into the death

Disgust 14
category (Haidt et al., 1994), and those who score highly on disgust sensitivity also score
high on a fear-of-death scale (Haidt et al., 1994). Rozin, Haidt and McCauley (2000)
surmise that disgust helps to suppress thoughts or experiences that suggest human
mortality. The present focus is not on this link between disgust and mortality, but rather
the more general connection of disgust to reminders of our animal qualities.
The role of mortality salience naturally contributes to a more general description
of disgust elicitors, since anything that reminds us that we are animals elicits disgust
(Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Haidt et al. (1997) write, “The massive restrictions that
Americans place on eating, sexuality and body modification, and the linkage of all three
to disgust, point to a concern about the human body that cannot be based on rational fears
about health…Rather, Americans seem at times to hold a view of the body observed in
other parts of the world: that the body is a temple, housing the self or the soul within” (p.
114). Rozin et al. (2000) write, “Humans must eat, excrete, and have sex, just like
animals. Each culture prescribes the proper way to perform these actions – by, for
example, placing most animals off limits as potential foods, and all animals and most
people off limits as potential sexual partners. People who ignore these prescriptions are
reviled as disgusting and animal-like” (p. 642).
Rozin (1990) compares the emotion of fear to the emotion of disgust; while fear
primarily guards against physical threats to the body, disgust protects against subtle
threats to the soul. Disgust uniquely involves a vertical dimension, setting it apart from
many other emotions; it involves elements of degradation and elevation and a strong
connection to purity and sacredness.
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The resolution of Cotton Mather while urinating alongside a dog – “Yet I will be
a more noble creature” - fits nicely with Miller’s (1997) broad conception of disgust:
“…ultimately the basis for all disgust is us – that we live and die and that the process is a
messy one emitting substances and odors that make us doubt ourselves and fear our
neighbors” (p. xiv). Just as Descartes saw the path to virtue guided by denying the soul of
beasts as the same as the soul of humans, Cotton Mather was greatly disturbed when the
boundary between human and animal became uncomfortably blurred. His soul was no
longer elevated, and his corporeal body was both repugnant and mortal.
Goldenberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Kluck and Cornwell (2001)
investigated why we, as humans, engage in so many activities that seem to minimize our
connections with other animals – we dress in the latest fashions, cook and prepare our
food to look attractive and tightly control our bodily activities. Even if we wish to
convince ourselves that we are not animals, the human body confounds us in certain
domains: people continue to eat, excrete and have sex. However, regardless of our
attempts to minimize our relationship to animals, evolutionary theory asserts that
humankind derived from the same stock as many primates and is closely related to a wide
variety of living things. Goldenberg et al. (2001) showed that mortality salience leads to
an increased emotional reaction of disgust to body products and animals. Her participants
were asked a series of questions regarding the views of two vignettes: one vignette
described people as distinct from animals, while the other vignette emphasized the
similarities between humans and animals. The researchers found that, compared to a
control condition, mortality salience led to a greater preference for the vignette describing
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people as distinct from animals. Within the mortality salient condition but not the control
condition, participants preferred the essay that emphasized distinctiveness from other
animals compared to the essay emphasizing the similarities.
Goldenberg et al.’s (2001) essay theme manipulation essentially espoused two
views: one explained that humans evolved from animals, and one explained that humans
are the unique product of some type of creation. The authors made no explicit mention to
either evolution or creationism, but the focus on human similarity to or human
uniqueness from animals leads me to wonder whether the disgust emotion is involved in
generating intuitions regarding theories of human evolution.
Is evolution disgusting?
Scott (2004) writes that close to 50% of Americans reject evolution, and Miller,
Scott and Okamoto (2006) found that the nation is almost evenly divided in terms of
accepting or rejecting it. About 35% of those who support Creationism adopt a literal
interpretation of the bible, with which evolution is an incompatible view. But what about
those who adopt a more mainstream, nonliteralist interpretation? Scott (2004) argues that
evolution, for them, is mostly a matter of human exceptionalism. Evolution
unquestionably contains an “ick factor” – there is greater comfort in seeing a bold line
demarcating us from animals than acknowledging that we are inextricably linked. This is
the essence of Descartes’ writing on the distinction between the soul of humans and the
soul of beasts, which certainly continues to hold intuitive appeal. Inbar et al. (2009)
investigated the relationship between disgust and evaluations of homosexuality and note
that individuals may at some level evaluate homosexuality as “wrong” but are able to
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consciously override these intuitions when asked to provide explicit judgment. The
present study investigates the analogous process by which individuals make judgments
regarding human uniqueness and, by extension, evolution.
Emotion may play a significant role in mediating these evolutionary beliefs –
perhaps more than political or religious orientation – and this study investigates the role
of disgust in such intuitions. And while disgust may play a role in the highly
controversial topic of human evolution, a weaker hypothesis holds that disgust drives a
preference for the view that humans are created uniquely and are irreducible to mere
animals. Across three studies, I seek to demonstrate a link between disgust and the view
that humans are the exceptional product of a unique creation process.
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Study 1
Study 1 tested my strongest hypothesis by using explicit mention of evolution
versus creationism. I primed participants to feel either disgusted or emotionally neutral,
and used an Implicit Association Test of words related to evolution, creationism, good,
and bad. I predicted that those made to feel disgusted would show an implicit preference
for creationism.
Method
Participants
Seventy-three Macalester College students (46 females and 27 males, M = 19.51
years old, SD = 1.41 years) participated in exchange for course credit or lottery prizes,
though nine non-native English speakers were excluded from analyses involving the IAT.
Participants self-reported to be fairly liberal and religiously unobservant: on a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative, M = 2.29, SD = .91, and on a
similar scale ranging from not at all religious to extremely religious, M = 2.10, SD =
1.36. Participants were recruited from the Introduction to Psychology course for course
credit, and students from other classes on campus also participated in exchange for the
opportunity to win lottery prizes. All participants were told that the study was titled
“Film Clips and Reaction Time” and were randomly assigned to either the experimental
condition or the control condition.
Procedure
After random assignment, participants entered a lab where they provided
informed consent and watched a video clip that either primed the disgust emotion or a
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video clip that was emotionally neutral. They then rated how much they were
experiencing various emotions as a manipulation check for the disgust prime. This scale
contained seven items (trust, joy, fear, surprise, disgust, sadness, anticipation, anger).
Participants then completed an Implicit Associations Test (IAT) for creationism versus
evolution and completed the Disgust Sensitivity Scale. Last, they provided demographic
information and answered whether or not they were aware of the true purpose of the
study; they were subsequently debriefed.
Disgust prime
Participants in the experimental condition watched a 1 minute and 10 second film
clip from Trainspotting that involved a disgusting toilet. Participants in the control
condition watched an identically long neutral scene about whales from the documentary
Planet Earth. Schnall, Benton and Harvey (2008) and Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan
(2008) used these videos successfully in their research on disgust.
IAT materials and design
The present study necessitated an implicit measure to test for a preference of
evolution versus creationism. Although Nosek (2005) demonstrated a significant positive
correlation between implicit IAT preferences and explicit preferences on a wide range of
pairs, including evolution and creationism, I hypothesized that the politically and
religiously left-leaning sample would likely be unwilling to admit a preference for
creationism explicitly. For those in the experimental condition, the connection between
the emotional induction of disgust and performance of the subsequent task should not

Disgust 20
have been available to conscious awareness, and hence I necessarily measured the way
their affective states drove an implicit preference.
Materials consisted of a set of words or short phrases representing the categories
“evolution” and “creationism” obtained from Nosek (2005). Nosek’s six items were God,
Bible, Religion, Creator, Created, and Six Days. Because I thought the phrase “Six Days”
would be confusing to participants who are not familiar with creationist theory, I
substituted “Intelligent Design” in its place. Items related to evolution were: Darwin,
Origin of Species, Science, Natural Selection, Eons, and Evolved. The categories “good”
and “bad” were represented by six positive words (e.g., “Wonderful”) and six negative
words (e.g., “Horrible”).
The IAT consisted of five practice blocks and two critical blocks. In the first
practice block, participants used two response keys to sort the stimuli that represented
“evolution” or “creationism,” and in the second practice block used the same two keys to
sort valenced words as either “good” or “bad,” and in the third practice block they sorted
words related to “evolution” and “creationism” simultaneously with words related to
“good” and “bad.” Half of the participants were told to pair “evolution” and “good” with
one key and “creationism” and “bad” using the other key. The other half of the
participants was instructed to perform the reverse. Immediately after the third practice
block, participants began the first critical block, which was identical to the practice block
they had just performed except for being longer (40 trials rather than 24 trials). After the
first critical block, key assignments were changed such that the key used previously to
indicate the category “evolution” was now used to indicate “creationism,” and vice versa.

Disgust 21
They were given one practice block to sort stimuli representing “evolution” and
“creationism” according to the new key assignments, and then a practice block in which
they sorted these words simultaneously with valenced words in the opposite combination
as before (e.g., if the participant was previously told to use one key to categorize
“evolution” and “good,” he or she was now instructed to use one key to categorize
“evolution” and “bad” together). Immediately following this practice block, participants
completed the second critical block, which was identical to the practice except for being
longer (40 trials rather than 24 trials). Practice blocks were not scored, and critical blocks
yielded response times measured in milliseconds. I used these response times to calculate
an overall D score, similar to a Cohen’s d for effect size, according to Greenwald, Nosek
and Banaji (2003). This score denoted the strength and direction of an individual’s
preference for either evolution or creationism.
Manipulation check
To ensure that participants in the experimental condition were indeed more
disgusted than those in the control condition, they were asked to rate how much they
were experiencing eight emotions on a seven-point Likert scale (ranging from not at all
to completely). These items were taken from Plutchik’s (1991) list of eight basic
emotions. Disgust, the target emotion, was listed among these items.
Disgust sensitivity scale
To control for a potential moderator, I measured individual sensitivity to disgust
(Haidt, McCauley & Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji, Williams, Tolin, Sawchuck,
Abramowitz and Lohr (2007). Participants rated how much they agreed with certain
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statements (e.g., “It would bother me tremendously to touch a dead body”) on a 4-point
Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly disagree, and how disgusting they
would find certain activities (e.g., “You discover that a friend of yours changes
underwear only once a week”) on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from not disgusting at all
to extremely disgusting. In addition to revealing wide variation in sensitivity, Haidt,
McCauley and Rozin (1994) demonstrated a positive correlation between the scale and
the degree to which subjects would actually engage in a wide range of disgusting
activities (Rozin et al., 1999). Olatunji et al. (2007) found the internal reliability of the
revised scale to have a Cronbach’s alpha of .87, which was almost identical to our finding
(α = .86).
Demographic information
Participants provided their age, gender, and political orientation on a Likert scale
ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). They also provided their religious
identification (if any) and how religious they were (on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from
1, not at all religious, to 7, extremely religious). To recognize whether participants were
aware of the nature of the study, they were asked to describe what they believed to be the
true purpose of the study. I planned to exclude those who were aware of the nature of the
study, but nobody successfully guessed the true purpose.
Results
Manipulation check
To test whether participants in the experimental condition were more disgusted
than those in the control condition, I performed an ANOVA to reveal a main effect of
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condition on current experience of disgust (M = 5.95, SD = 1.27 and M = 1.25, SD = .50,
respectively; F(1,71) = 428.69, p < .001). Thus, participants who viewed a disgusting
film rated themselves as experiencing disgust significantly more than those who viewed
an emotionally neutral film. There was an unexpected effect of condition on all of the
other emotions, except for anticipation. Unsurprisingly, those in the disgust condition
displayed a more negative general affect than those in the control condition. To test for
this, I collapsed trust, joy and surprise to generate a composite score of average positive
affect and collapsed fear, sadness and anger to generate a composite score of average
negative affect.
Indeed, those in the disgust condition displayed more negative emotion (M = 2.73,
SD = .92) than those in the control condition (M = 1.69, SD = .70; F(1,71) = 29.60, p <
.001). I ran a repeated measures ANOVA for positive emotion, negative emotion and
disgust, and found a significant interaction effect of condition and emotion: F(2,70) =
162.55, p < .001. As evident in Figure 1, the difference in levels of disgust between
conditions is substantially more pronounced than the difference in either positive or
negative emotions. These findings are displayed in Figure 1.
Implicit evaluation of evolution
IAT scores were computed according to instructions provided by Greenwald,
Nosek and Banaji (2003) to produce an IAT D score for each participant. Higher D scores
indicate a more favorable implicit evaluation of evolution as opposed to creationism.
There was not a significant overall preference for either evolution or creationism.
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Among the 64 native English speaking participants, an ANOVA failed to detect a
main effect of condition on D score: F(1,62) = .261, p = .611. To test for an interaction
effect of disgust sensitivity, I recoded each participant’s score on the Disgust Sensitivity
Scale to either “high” or “low” depending on where this score fell relative to 1.6, the
average score obtained from www.yourmorals.com. An ANOVA failed to detect an
interaction effect on the D score (F(1,60) = 1.27, p = .264. Only level of religiousness
and overall D score were significantly correlated; as level of religiousness increased, so
did an implicit preference for creationism (r = -.31, p < .02).
Discussion
Study 1 failed to find an effect for disgust on implicit preference for evolution
versus creationism on an Implicit Associations Test. Average D scores measuring
preference for evolution. The IAT may not be a sensitive enough measure to capture this
subtle effect, and thus I now question whether the IAT was the most appropriate measure
for the present study. The IAT was used successfully by Inbar et al. (2009) to show that
disgust sensitivity predicts an intuitive disapproval of gays. More recently, however, in a
study testing whether inducing disgust leads to a disapproval of gays, Inbar confirmed
that the IAT did not detect an effect following a disgust prime, although alternate
measures were successful (Inbar, personal communication, 3/1/2010). I attribute this flaw
in the method to potential issues of length, as it is likely that the emotional effects of the
prime, which lasted only 80 seconds, diminished over the period of the IAT, which took
approximately 10 minutes to complete. The IAT may have been more effective if I had a
less homogenous population (given the extremely left-leaning political student body).
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And last, a large proportion of the introductory psychology students that participated in
the present study had learned about the IAT in the same week during which they
participated; Nosek (2005) demonstrated that the strength of a manipulation diminishes
with IAT practice and experience, which may have been the case in the present study.
Study 1 also revealed an unexpectedly generalized emotional effect of the disgust
prime as opposed to the neutral prime, as seven of the eight emotions differed
significantly between groups and those in the disgust condition displayed significantly
more overall negative affect. The nonselective nature of the prime suggests that any
conclusions I make could not be attributed solely to feeling emotionally disgusted. Study
2 sought to demonstrate the relationship between disgust and attitudes concerning
evolution by using an alternative dependent measure, and Study 3 aimed to disambiguate
the disgust emotion from overall negative affect.
Study 2
Study 2 followed the aim of Study 1 to show that an emotional induction leads to
an implicit dislike for the view that humans evolved from animals but without explicit
mention of evolutionary theory. Participants were primed to feel disgusted or emotionally
neutral, and then rated passages written by supposed college students that either
emphasized the uniqueness of humans compared to other animals, or the similarity of
humans to related species. These passages escaped limitations of the IAT and I hoped
would detect a subtle effect. I would measure an implicit evaluation of evolutionary
theory. Since the study was administered online, I were unable to show a film clip as a
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mood induction and instead chose an alternate prime that I believed to be of equal or
greater strength.
Method
Participants
One hundred and thirty eight college students (109 females, 28 males, and one
participant of unknown gender) participated in this online survey. Six participants who
were not of college age were excluded from analyses. The remaining participants ranged
in age from 18-25 with a mean age of 21.05 years (SD = 1.40 years). Overall, participants
self-reported as politically liberal and religiously unobservant on 7-point Likert scales
identical to the ones in Study 1 (M = 2.53, SD = 1.28 and M = 2.64, SD = 1.81,
respectively). All participants were told that the study was titled “Writing and reading
texts” and were randomly assigned to either the experimental condition or the control
condition.
Procedure
After random assignment, participants in the experimental condition completed a
mood induction task to make them feel disgusted; participants in the emotionally neutral
control condition were asked to describe the room in which they were sitting. All
participants then completed a manipulation check to assess their current emotional state.
Participants then read one of two vignettes and answered several questions evaluating the
text. Participants then provided demographic information and were subsequently
debriefed.
Materials
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Mood induction: One frequently used method, developed by Bodenhausen,
Shepard and Kramer (1994), asks participants to write about a time in their lives when
they experienced a certain emotion. In line with Schnall et al. (2008), participants in the
experimental condition were asked to write about a specific event that happened to them
that involved seeing or touching something physically disgusting. Instructions specified
that the event should be one that made the participant feel physically ill or sick to the
stomach. Participants were asked to relive the experience and to write at least ten
sentences containing as much detail as possible. Participants in the control condition were
asked to write at least ten sentences describing in detail the room in which they were
sitting. Participants who did not follow the directions of the emotional induction were not
allowed to continue with the study; several people did quit the survey in their browser
before completing this question and were thus not included in analyses. All those who
provided full data wrote at least six sentences. I believed their free responses to be of
adequate strength for the emotional induction to take effect, and thus included all
participants in our analyses.
Manipulation check: To ensure that the mood induction made participants in the
experimental condition feel more disgusted than those in the control condition, all
participants completed a short emotion scale. On 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1
(not at all), to 7 (completely) they evaluated how much they were presently experiencing
four separate emotions: trust, disgust, anticipation and anger. I aimed to use a shorter
manipulation check than that of Study 1 to capture the target emotion (disgust), both a
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positive and negative emotion (trust and anger), and one emotion that should not change
with condition (anticipation).
Essay theme manipulation: To assess the need to see oneself as distinct from other
animals, participants read an essay either emphasizing the similarity of humans to other
animals or the uniqueness of humans as compared to other animals (Goldenberg et al.,
2001). The directions stated that the passage was written by a college student and they
were told that they were randomly selected to read about a certain topic and provide their
opinion. In actuality, however, there were two essays (one explicating the view that
humans are similar to animals, and one that humans are different from animals). The
former essay claimed that:
The boundary between humans and animals is not as great as most people
think…what appears to be the result of complex thought and free will is
really just the result of our biological programming and simple learning
experiences.
The latter, on the other hand, stated that:
Although we humans have some things in common with the other animals,
human beings are truly unique…we are not simple selfish creatures driven
by hunger and lust, but complex individuals with a will of our own,
capable of making choices, and creating our own desires.
Both essays were titled, “The most important things that I have learned about human
nature” and were shown to be comparable in level of difficulty (Goldenberg, Arndt,
Routledge & Hart, 2005).
Text evaluation: The essay was followed with six questions assessing reactions to
the essay and the author (Goldenberg et al., 2001). Specifically, participants were asked,
“How much do you think you would like this person?” “How intelligent do you believe
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this person to be?” “How knowledgeable do you believe this person to be?” “Is this
person’s opinion well-informed?” “How much do you agree with this person’s opinion?”
and “From your perspective, how true do you think this person’s opinion is of the topic
they discussed?” Participants rated each item on a 7-point Likert scale, with 1 reflecting
the most negative evaluation and 7 the most positive evaluation. According to
Goldenberg et al. (2001), Cronbach’s alpha was .86 for both essay themes. In the present
study, Cronbach’s alpha for both stories was .91.
Demographic information: Participants provided their age, gender and political
orientation on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very conservative). They
also provided their religious identification (if any) and how religious they were (on a
Likert scale ranging from 1, not at all religious, to 7, extremely religious). To recognize
whether participants were aware of the nature of the study, they were asked to describe
what they believed to be the true purpose of the study. No participants were aware of the
nature of the experiment.
Results
Manipulation check
Study 2 compared groups on four emotions: disgust (the target item), trust,
anticipation and anger. Those who wrote about a time they felt significantly more
disgusted did indeed report more disgust than those in the control condition (M = 4.02,
SD = 2.01 and M = 2.26, SD = 1.48, respectively; F(1,130) = 33.10, p < .001). I also
found a main effect of condition on anger, with those in the disgust condition displaying
more anger than those in the control condition (M = 2.73, SD = 1.85 and M = 2.03, SD =
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1.33, respectively; F(1,137) = 6.44, p < .02). Again, those made to feel disgusted
displayed a more generalized negative affect than those in the control condition. To
measure the change in positive affect, negative affect and disgust, I used a repeated
measures ANOVA to reveal a significant interaction of condition and emotion (for
disgust, trust and anger), F(2,129) = 12.05, p < .001. This mirrors our findings in study 1:
although experimental groups differed in overall positive and negative affect, rather than
differing purely on disgust, the difference in levels of disgust between groups was much
greater than that of either anger or trust.
Essay theme manipulation
A univariate ANOVA revealed a significant interaction effect of condition
(disgust versus control) and essay theme (humans are unique from animals versus
humans are similar to animals) on a composite rating score of the essay, F(1,128) = 3.98,
p < .05. Those made to feel disgusted rated the human unique vignette more favorably
than those not disgusted (M = 4.50, SD = 1.60 and M = 4.06, SD = 1.17, respectively).
Similarly, those made to feel disgusted rated the human similar essay less favorably than
those not disgusted (M = 3.87, SD = 1.06 and M = 4.28, SD = 1.00, respectively). While
this interaction was significant, however, there was no significant main effect for
condition when I tested for each text manipulation separately, and this interaction effect
of condition and essay theme is shown in Figure 2. I also found a significant positive
correlation between political orientation and composite rating score of the human
uniqueness essay (r = .29, p < .03), although neither political orientation nor level of
religiousness moderated the interaction effect.
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Discussion
Study 2 revealed an interaction effect of condition and essay theme manipulation
on composite rating of the vignette. Those made to feel disgusted rated the human
uniqueness more favorably than did those in the control condition. These results support
our hypothesis that disgust plays a role in implicit judgments of evolution; indeed, those
in the disgust condition favored the view that humans are distinct from animals (a
creationist standpoint) more than the view that humans are inherently similar to animals
(an evolutionarily based view).
The emotional induction in Study 2 elicited an unwanted effect similar to that of
Study 1 because those in the disgust condition displayed more anger and less trust than
those in the control condition, suggesting that the disgust induction led to more negative
overall affect. Study 3 sought to disambiguate this emotional confound. I aimed to
establish the same findings of Study 2 while controlling for negative affect.
Study 3
Study 3 utilized an emotional induction identical to the first study but with an
additional sadness condition. As a dependent measure, I used Goldenberg’s (2001)
human uniqueness essay. Again, the goal of Study 3 was to demonstrate that inducing
disgust causes an increased liking for the view that humans are created unique as opposed
to evolved from animals, and that this effect is specific to the disgust emotion.
Method
Participants
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45 Macalester College students (17 males, 28 females; M = 19.14 years-old, SD =
1.00 years) participated for course credit or were independently recruited from various
groups on campus. Participants were similar to those in Study 1, and self reported to be
politically liberal (M = 2.32, SD = 1.00) and religiously unobservant (M = 2.57, SD =
1.51) on 7-point Likert scales. All participants were told that the study was titled “Film
clips and memory” and that they would first watch a film, then complete an unrelated
task, and then return to the film. They were randomly assigned to one of two
experimental conditions or to the control condition.
Procedure
After random assignment, participants were either induced to feel disgusted or
sad, or were assigned to an emotionally neutral control condition. Each condition
watched a different film of equivalent length. They then completed a manipulation check,
read a short essay and answered several questions evaluating the text. Participants then
provided demographic information and, instead of returning to the film, were
subsequently debriefed and probed for suspicion as to how the two tasks were related.
One participant was excluded from analyses for correctly suspecting the true purpose of
the study.
Materials
Mood induction: The disgust and control primes were identical to those in Study 1
(Trainspotting and Planet Earth). Those in the sadness condition watched a scene from
the 1979 film The Champ in which a young boy watches his father die. All films were
exactly 1 minute and 10 seconds long. These videos were shown to successfully prime
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the appropriate emotions (or leave participants emotionally neutral) by Schnall, Benton
and Harvey (2008) and Schnall, Haidt, Clore and Jordan (2008).
Manipulation check: Although I used the same emotional induction in Study 1,
the addition of a sadness condition necessitated a manipulation check. Participants rated
how much they were experiencing the same 8 emotions described in Study 1 on 7-point
Likert scales ranging from not at all to completely.
Essay evaluation: Study 2 randomly assigned participants to read one of two
vignettes from Goldenberg et al. (2001) describing humans as either similar to or unique
from animals. The present study provided all participants with the human uniqueness
essay since Goldenberg et al. (2001) found an effect of condition only on this vignette,
and Study 2 demonstrated a similar pattern. The instructions were identical to those used
in Study 2.
Text evaluation: The essay was followed with six questions assessing reactions to
the essay and the author, identical to those used in Study 2 (Goldenberg et al., 2001).
Demographic information: Participants provided their age and gender as well as
their political orientation on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (very liberal) to 7 (very
conservative). They also provided their religious identification (if any) and how religious
they were (on a Likert scale ranging from 1, not at all religious, to 7, extremely
religious). To recognize whether participants were aware of the nature of the study, they
were asked to describe what they believed to be the true purpose of the study.
Results
Manipulation Check
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In similar fashion to the previous studies, a multivariate ANOVA revealed a main
effect of condition for level of disgust, with those in the disgust condition being
significantly more disgusted that those in either the sadness or control conditions: F(2,41)
= 85.69, p < .001. As expected, participants in the sadness condition reported experienced
significantly greater sadness than either of the other two conditions: F(2,41) = 22.06, p <
.001. After collapsing the positive emotions (trust, joy) and the negative emotions (fear,
sadness, anger), I found that the three conditions differed overall with regard to overall
positive affect (F(2,41) = 20.49, p < .001) and overall negative affect (F(2,41) = 11.34, p
< .001). Post-hoc analysis revealed that those in the sadness condition experienced more
overall negative affect (M = 3.49, SD = 1.29) than those in the disgust condition (M =
2.16, SD = 1.00); p < .003. I collapsed the positive emotions (trust, joy) and the negative
emotions (fear, sadness, anger) to compile average scores on positive and negative affect.
As is evident, the sadness condition added a dimension of negative affect that exceeded
the effects of priming for disgust.
Text evaluation
I used an ANOVA to test for a main effect of condition on text evaluation. In a
similar manner to Study 2, I created a composite score for each participant’s evaluation
of the text, with higher numbers signifying a greater liking of the author’s ideas. I failed
to detect this effect (F(2,41) = .87, p = .43). As is evident in Figure 3, those in the sadness
condition displayed the greatest preference for the text (M = 4.30, SD = 1.21), followed
by the disgust condition (M = 4.02, SD = 1.07) and then the control condition (M = 3.80,
SD = .73). Although analyses did not reveal significance, a bivariate correlation revealed
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that level of disgust correlated more highly text evaluation (r = .23, p = .13) than did
overall negative affect (r = .18, p = .25), sadness (r =.12, p =.46), or overall positive
affect (r = -.01, p = .95).
Discussion
Study 3 sought to disambiguate the emotional effect of inducing disgust while
demonstrating that those who are disgusted will show an increased liking for the view
that humans are created unique. The present study failed to detect a main effect of
condition.
The aim of Study 3 was to elaborate the results of Study 2; I sought to maintain
significance regarding disgust and text evaluation while simultaneously disambiguating
the overall negative affect that results from inducing disgust. Study 2 revealed a
significant interaction effect between condition and essay theme manipulation (i.e.,
human uniqueness or human similarity with animals), and the present study eliminated
the human similarity vignette due to practical constraints (e.g., time, lack of naive
participants). It is possible that the present study would have revealed a significant
interaction effect of condition (control, sadness, or disgust) and essay theme manipulation
had I been able to include both essays. In addition, the rather small population size and
extremely left-leaning political student body constrained our ability to detect the wanted
effect.
It remains unclear as to why those in the sadness condition displayed such great
preference for the human uniqueness essay. I do, however, have reason to believe that the
sadness induction elicited unwanted mortality salience that interfered with the wanted
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effect. The video used to prime sadness (The Champ) illustrates a boy watching his
father, a boxer, die after competition. I chose to use this film following Schnall et al.
(2008), who tested for the effects of disgust as opposed to sadness for generalized moral
judgment. The present study targeted a very specific moral concern (i.e., feelings of
approval or disapproval regarding the idea that humans are uniquely created). Goldenberg
et al. (2001) demonstrated the link between mortality salience and a preference for the
view that humans are created uniquely using the exact same passage in the present study.
I believe the mortality concerns raised by The Champ may have elicited a type of disgust
distinct from the type of disgust elicited by the Trainspotting toilet video. The Disgust
Sensitivity Scale (Haidt et al., 2007) identifies disgust elicitors as reducible to either
contamination factors, death related concepts, or animal reminders. The mortality
concerns raised by the sadness prime could have not only elicited a type of disgust
distinct from that in the disgust prime, but also likely elicited feelings of creatureliness
and the need to assert human uniqueness (Goldenberg, 2001). This combination of
disgust and mortality salience likely occurred at an implicit level beyond participants’
conscious awareness, and this accounts for why the manipulation check did not reveal a
significant difference in present level of the disgust emotion between the sadness and
disgust conditions, even though both groups were experiencing a certain level of disgust.
And although this prime was used successfully in past studies looking at the effects of
emotional disgust on moral judgment (e.g., Schnall et al, 2008), our particular focus was
on this issue of human creatureliness, which Goldenberg et al. (2001) related to
mortality-accessible thoughts. Overall, it seems that the concept of death in the sadness
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prime elicited the need to assert human uniqueness, and this interfered with the
emergence of the desired effect. To eliminate this confound, a follow-up study would use
a sadness prime that makes no mention of death, and also use both of Goldenberg et al.’s
(2001) creatureliness primes to reveal an interaction effect of essay theme manipulation
and condition. If this change in priming stimulus, together with the human similarity text
manipulation, yielded insignificant results, I would conclude that this effect does not exist
and abandon the present research question.
General Discussion
The goal of this study was to investigate the role of the disgust emotion in shaping
intuitions regarding evolutionary theory. In particular, I was interested in the
creatureliness aspect of human evolution (i.e., the idea that humans are mere animals and
inextricably linked to a mortal body) and the need for humans to see themselves as an
elevated species that is unique from our primate ancestors. The present set of studies
investigated whether priming disgust leads to an implicit preference for the belief that
humans are uniquely created. Study 1 tested my stronger hypothesis – that disgust
induces an implicit preference for creationism over evolution using an IAT and failed to
detect significance. Study 2 used a text theme manipulation and found that those primed
to feel disgusted showed greater preference for a vignette arguing that humans are unique
from, as opposed to similar to, animals. Study 3 aimed to disambiguate disgust from
overall negative effect and failed to detect a main effect of condition when I added a
sadness condition. Taken together, the present research failed to confirm that disgust is
directly related to intuitions regarding human evolution. Study 2 did, however, provide
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preliminary evidence that disgust is related to intuitions of human exceptionalism,
although a follow-up on Study 3 is necessary to disambiguate the disgust emotion from
overall negative affect. In the future, I hope to re-run Study 3 with both the human
uniqueness and human similarity texts and will use a sadness prime that does not
reference mortality or death. If this does not reveal a significant interaction of condition
and text theme manipulation, then I will conclude that this effect does not exist. The
present results should be taken meaningfully only should this follow-up run successfully.
Inbar et al. (2008) and Inbar et al. (2009) found that disgust is related to being
politically conservative and to an intuitive disapproval of homosexuals, and Goldenberg
et al. (2001) showed that mortality salience drives individuals to prefer the view that
humans are created uniquely. The present set of studies extends this body of research
with tentative evidence that the disgust emotion drives intuitions regarding human
exceptionalism. In the future, I hope to extrapolate this finding to evolution in general,
although much work will be needed to construct a measure that will detect such a subtle
effect. I also hope to continue researching disgust as a form of embodied cognition, and
make use of highly visceral stimuli (e.g., disgusting smells, tastes, etc.). At the broadest
level, this research supports Haidt’s (2001) social intuitionist model of moral: the disgust
emotion plays a role in motivating intuitions of approval or disapproval for the view that
humans are a uniquely created species.
Does a preference for human uniqueness inform personal stance on evolution?
According to the Church of Christ Christian Courier, “The most insidious and
damaging ideology ever foisted upon the mind of modern man is the notion that human
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beings are but animals, and the offspring of other, more primitive creatures” (Jackson,
2002). He cites alternate reasons for rejecting evolution (e.g., an escape from moral
responsibility, dislike of cultural reductionism) but points to the creatureliness component
as the most emotionally disturbing.
The initial goal of this research was to uncover an affective component of
judgments of evolutionary theory with particular focus on the disgust emotion and this
issue of creatureliness. Study 1 focused narrowly on the terms “evolution” and
“creationism” but failed to find significance on an IAT with this specific set of word
items (Intelligent Design, God, Bible, Religion, Creator and Created for Creationism
terms, and Darwin, Origin of Species, Science, Natural Selection, Eons and Evolved for
evolution words). Studies 2 and 3 extended this investigation to the broader notion of
human uniqueness without explicit mention of evolution, creationism, a divine creator, or
intelligent design. The idea of human uniqueness is, nonetheless, fundamental to the
controversy over human evolution, and Scott (2004) argues that even among religious
individuals who take a non-literalist interpretation of the bible, a denial of evolution
hinges most centrally on a matter of human exceptionalism, or the idea that humans are
unique from their animal relatives. The vignettes created by Goldenberg et al. (2001) and
used in Studies 1 and 2 tapped into this idea of human exceptionalism as opposed to
animal and human similarity, but further work is needed to understand whether her
concept of creatureliness is related to the concept of evolution. The results of this
research, then, shed preliminary light on human uniqueness and do not demonstrate a
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direct relationship between the disgust emotion and judgments concerning human
evolution.
The place of emotion in America’s “culture war”
An overarching goal that I sought to achieve in the present research is to better
understand the role that emotion plays in resisting materialist theories of mind, which
broadly view all facts of the mind as causally dependent upon, or even reducible to,
physical processes. Searle (1992) surveys the history of the mind-body problem and
argues that the general landscape of the topic is confined to a dualist vocabulary that
stems from Descartes’ writings. He argues that the whole tradition of philosophy is
confused because any attempts to override dualism still work under the framework of a
stark distinction between materialism and immaterialism, as the mind sciences tend to
flee from subjectivity out of a fear that mental phenomena will collapse into a form of
dualism, with strict categories signifying the mind and the body separately. And as
Bloom (2004) confirms, it is the nature of the human cognitive system to operate this way
- the great majority of people are still operating under this folk psychological framework,
carving the world into souls and bodies and perceiving a uniquely separate quality of the
mind as opposed to the body.
Searle’s (1992) arguments are quite radical and certainly controversial among
philosophers of mind, and it is not my attempt here to evaluate the strength of his
analysis. His conclusions are, however, quite provocative from a psychological
perspective. If he is correct that the history and current status of the mind-body problem
is stuck in a dualist vocabulary, then I ask what role emotion has played in informing the
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development of this philosophical dilemma. Certain individuals express resistance to
reducing the mind to the body, and hence resistance to materialist theories of mind, and
the present research provides preliminary evidence that the disgust emotion is involved in
generating intuitions regarding the unique creation of human life. My conclusions are, at
the present moment, quite preliminary and must be confirmed through more controlled
experimentation, but if I am correct, then there is an emotional component to the more
general resistance to scientific reductionism.
This project focused narrowly on the disgust emotion as distinct from other
negative emotions, especially sadness. The results of Study 2, although significant for
condition, were ambiguous regarding the role of an overall negative affect. Schnall et al.
(2008) argued for a specificity of the disgust emotion by showing that the effects of
disgust on moral judgment are not merely a manifestation of a general tendency for
negative affect to amplify moral judgments. Disgust holds a unique relationship to the
way we perceive ourselves and others as comprised of bodies and souls, and it holds
discrete physical (bodily) and social (moral) components (Bloom, 2004). And while the
present work failed to illuminate the unique nature of disgust as a moral emotion, I
attribute this to a flaw in the sadness prime used in Study 2 and hope that follow-up work
will successfully disambiguate disgust from the other negative emotions.
I argue that the role of emotion, especially disgust, in the resistance to scientific
reductionism is understudied in both psychology and philosophy. Social psychologists
possess the empirical tools to understand certain aspects of why these philosophical
dilemmas have progressed as they have. The topic of evolution is highly controversial in
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the political sphere, and especially focused on how we should teach evolution (or
creationism) in the schools. It is unlikely that knowledge of the emotional component of
this debate will quell concerns altogether, but what I hope is that work of this sort will
allow more room for sympathetic understanding on both sides. Graham, Haidt and Nosek
(2009) found that purity/sanctity concerns are one of five sets of moral foundations; they
are more related to moral concerns for conservatives in the United States than they are for
liberals, and they thus illuminate the inextricability of moral disagreements from the
American “culture war,” or the idea that America is polarized on a set of cultural morals
or values. National Center for Science Education executive director Eugenie Scott (2010)
expressed that some Americans hold religious convictions regarding evolution that are at
odds with secular Ameriacn society, and the schools are prime ground on which culture is
passed on generationally. The present work focuses on issues concerning the nature of
human life, a general stance on scientific reductionism and, by extension, views on
evolution as part of this “culture war.” My hope is that the present work genuinely
contributes to this trend in understanding social issues of religion or politics from the
perspective of moral psychology.
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Disgust**

Trust*

Joy**

Fear

Surprise

Sadness**

Anticipation

Anger*

Disgust

6.33(.90)

2.53(1.60)

2.67(1.54)

2.80(1.37)

5.07(1.71)

2.27(1.16)

3.87(1.81)

1.40(0.83)

Sadness

2.93(1.62)

3.27(1.90)

2.27(1.44)

2.80(1.47)

3.60(1.40)

5.00(1.46)

3.01(1.83)

2.67(1.50)

Control

1.07(.27)

4.71(1.54)

4.79(1.42)

2.36(1.69)

4.14(1.75)

1.93(1.49)

3.71(1.90)

1.21(0.43)

Note. * p < .01, ** p < .001
Table 1. Means and standard deviations for Study 3 manipulation check. A MANOVA
revealed a significant main effect of condition for disgust, trust, joy, sadness and anger.
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Figure 1. Change in positive affect, negative affect, and disgust between conditions.
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Figure 2. Disgust induction causes increased liking for human uniqueness.
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Figure 3. Text evaluation by condition. Those in the sadness condition displayed the
greatest liking for the text, although this difference among groups was not significant.

